ResearchPolicyCommitmentsLearnNewsTry ClaudeAnnouncementsOur position on open-weights modelsJul 27, 2026A post by Dario Amodei, Anthropic CEO
Over the last few days there has been a lot of discussion about open-weights models, especially those from China. Reports suggest that some US officials are considering banning the use of Chinese open-weights models by US companies. In response, many tech companies have signed a letter supporting open-weights models, and some people have even accused Anthropic of wanting to ban open-weights models as a means of protecting our business. Anyone who has read my past writing should know that I don’t regard such bans as a useful measure, but let me state it clearly so that there is no doubt: Anthropic has never advocated for a ban on open-weights models.
Open-weights models that don’t have dangerous capabilities are a public good: they don’t cost anything besides the compute needed to run them, and they provide value to businesses, developers, and researchers.
Protectionist bans would not address my most serious national security concerns. Specifically, I am worried about two nightmare scenarios. I laid these out in my essay The Adolescence of Technology six months ago1, and have held these positions consistently for many years:
To address these concerns, I do support the following three measures, which I and Anthropic have consistently advocated for:
This brings me to the open letter. I agree with much of it: open weights expand access to the AI economy, they strengthen competition at least for some use cases, and they give customers greater control. Concerns about distillation should be addressed through targeted legal and commercial frameworks—the same measure I described above. But I don’t agree with the letter’s assertions that open-weights models necessarily make it easier to develop safeguards or that broad access to capabilities necessarily helps defenders more than attackers. It seems at least as likely to me that the opposite will be true. For example, I worry that biology will have a strong attacker-defender asymmetry, where sufficiently capable models may be able to quickly weaponize pandemic-level viruses with widely available materials, whereas defense against these agents is a multi-year operational task in the best case (as we saw with Operation Warp Speed)5. Questions like this should be empirically answered by rigorous pre-release testing, not assumed in advance.
To summarize my and Anthropic’s position, we have not and are not advocating for a ban on open-weights models as a category. We should instead focus on keeping powerful chips out of authoritarian hands, stopping industrial-scale distillation, and requiring safety testing of all sufficiently capable models, open and closed.
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Official Announcement
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